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This paper uses an intertemporal model of public finances to show that political 
instability can cause taxes to be tilted to the future, resulting in a fiscal deficit that 
is suboptimal and only weakly sustainable (in the sense of Quintos). This occurs 
because political instability gives the government an incentive to implement a 
myopic fiscal policy in order to increase its chances of remaining in office. The 
government achieves this by delaying taxes (or advancing spending) in order 
to buy political support, which in turn causes an upward trend in the deficit 
process and a financial crisis. Using annual data for Chile for the 1833-1999 
period, we present statistical test results that support the model.
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1.  Introduction 
The history of many developing countries shows that political crises 
and budgetary fiscal crises often occur together. Some notable examples are 
Indonesia 1998, Argentina 2002, Ecuador 1999, Russia 1998, Venezuela 1902, 
Bolivia 1985, and Chile in both 1891 and 1973. For example, the three largest 
government deficits in Chilean history occurred during the 1971-1973 period. 
This period of financial instability ended after a military junta took power during 
the winter of 1973, also ending several decades of political instability. Similarly, 
the fourth largest deficit in Chilean history (and the largest of the 19th century) 
occurred in 1891, the same year President José Manuel Balmaceda was deposed 
in a bloody civil war, bringing closure to a three-decade-long power struggle 
between the Chilean Congress and the Presidency. 
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Another legislative-presidential dispute reached a crisis point in Russia 
during 1993. Although President Boris Yeltsin of Russia won the initial battle 
and succeeded in pushing through a constitution establishing a strong presidency, 
the new government’s ability to make debt payments was almost constantly in 
doubt. Finally, in August 1998 Russia defaulted on both its domestic and foreign 
debt. At the end of the following year President Yeltsin resigned and Vladimir 
Putin became president. This ended, at least temporarily, both the political and 
the fiscal crisis. 
To illustrate this phenomenon, Figure 1A shows central government revenue 
and spending (as a share of GDP) and Figure 1B shows central government 
fiscal deficit (as a share of GDP) in Bolivia for the period from 1970 to 2003. 
According to the data, between 1970 and 1985 the deficit increased dramatically 
from 2% to more than 40% of GDP, a period during which Bolivia had 14 
different presidents (an average of one president per year).
Solimano (2003) shows that ten of these presidents did not complete 
their term in office because of a coup, resignation or some other form of extra-
constitutional, forced removal (see Table 1). This period of political instability 
finally ended when Victor Paz Estenssoro became president in 1985. Notably, 
the government’s fiscal crisis ended as well, with the budget being practically 
balanced from 1986 to 1991.
TABLE 1
BOLIVIA: PRESIDENTIAL CRISES, 1970-1997
 (Crisis year)  President  Pres. perioda  Deficit
  (1970)  A. Ovando 1969-1970 1.93
  (1971)  J.J. Tores 1970-1971 3.86
    H. Banzer 1971-1978 2.98
  (1978)  J. Pereda 1978-1979 3.99
  (1979)  D. Padilla, W. Guevara, A. Natush 1979-1979 7.37
  (1980)  L. Gueiler 1979-1980 7.92
  (1981)  L. Garcia 1980-1981 6.81
  (1982)  C. Torrelio, A. Mariscal, G. Vildoso 1981-1982 27.74
  (1985)  H. Siles 1982-1985 33.38
    V. Paz 1985-1989 0.97
    J. Paz 1989-1993 2.53
    G. Sanchez 1993-1997 3.21
Source: Solimano (2003). The names of presidents who did not complete their period because of a 
coup, resignation or non-voluntary removals are highlighted. The crisis year is shown in brackets. 
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FIGURE 1a
BOLIVIa: TOTaL REVENUE aND TOTaL SPENDING
1960-2000
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These are just a few examples of many which indicate that there is an 
association between political instability and fiscal crisis in developing countries. 
Scholars who address this association tend to focus their attention on the political 
consequences of economic policies, as do Chang (2007), Haggard (2000) and 
Frankel (2005). Similarly, Panzer and Paredes (1991) and Cerda and Vergara (2007, 
2008) examine the political consequences of economic policies in Chile. 
This paper, however, shows that there is something to be learned by turning 
this relationship around and examine the consequences of politics in developing 
countries on economic policy. The pioneering work in this regard is Nordhaus’s paper 
(1975) on political business cycles. Nordhaus develops a model of opportunistic 
politicians manipulating pre-electoral economic variables (such as unemployment 
and inflation) in order to increase the likelihood of reelection. With backward-
looking agents, the incumbent has an incentive to induce a boom during the period 
immediately previous to an election without any worry that voters will take into 
account the possibility of a recession occurring afterwards.
One of the main criticisms of Nordhaus’s model is the key role assigned 
to the Phillips curve. In his model, the incumbent government promotes 
inflation-inducing policies to reduce unemployment while fiscal policies play 
no role. This is at odds with the empirical evidence presented by a number of 
authors including Rogoff (1990), Drazen (2000), Gonzalez (2002), and Cerda 
and Vergara (2008) that implies that fiscal policy is an important tool of pre-
electoral manipulation. The paper by Cerda and Vergara (2008) analyzes the 
effect of government subsidies on presidential elections in Chile and finds that 
the greater the coverage of subsidies, the greater the number of votes received 
by the incumbent. 
One model that considers fiscal policies as a tool for pre-electoral 
manipulation is Rogoff’s (1990) model of political budget cycles (PBC). In this 
model, a politically motivated policy maker induces a tax cut (or an increase in 
spending) prior to election day with a consequent increase in taxes (or decrease 
in spending) afterwards, creating a cycle in the government’s budget deficit.
The model employed in our study differs from PBC models in one very 
important aspect. In PBC models, it is assumed that changes in power occur 
only on an election day so that the probability that an officeholder will remain 
in power during any given electoral period is always equal to one. Hence, there 
is no uncertainty about the length of tenure in office other than uncertainty 
about the outcome of the next election. In an unstable democracy, however, 
as suggested by the discussion in the first three paragraphs of this paper, the 
probability of remaining in office between electoral periods may be less than 
one, rendering the tenure period uncertain. Therefore, in the model developed 
below, as long as there is uncertainty about the length of tenure in office, the 
sure-thing post-electoral period as assumed by PBC models is never reached and 
therefore the decline phase of the budget cycle is never realized. As long as the 
probability of remaining in office between elections is less than one, the deficit 
will be trend-driven rather than cyclical, thereby increasing the probability of 
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In this paper political instability exists if the incumbent officeholder 
believes that the probability of remaining in office one more period is less than 
one. It is assumed that the officeholder is a ruling party with uncertain length of 
tenure because of political uncertainty. Based on these assumptions, a benevolent 
but politically unstable government places less weight on future welfare than 
it would under political stability. This causes the fiscal deficit to follow a time 
series process with at least one unit root and therefore, government debt is 
accumulating at a relatively fast rate. As a result, any shock to government 
revenues (or an adverse shock to a government’s ability to borrow) is more likely 
to cause a sovereign debt crisis under political instability than under political 
stability (Quintos, 1995). Hence, our model implies that political instability 
increases the probability of a government financial crisis.
The potential for financial crises to be caused by political instability has 
not received much attention in the literature. Frankel (2005) indirectly addresses 
the issue when he wonders why the worst speculative attacks associated with 
several foreign exchange crises during the 1990s occurred after an election 
rather than before it. The explanation Frankel offers is similar to the hypothesis 
proposed in this paper. A “devaluation is politically costly to leaders, and so 
in an election year they try to postpone it, whether to get reelected, or so that 
the crash comes on their successors’ watch rather than their own, or out of the 
hope that something will turn up to improve the balance of payments” (Frankel, 
2005, p. 7). This paper argues that a similar explanation is valid for fiscal crises. 
Taxes are politically costly to government both directly and indirectly through 
their distortionary cost. If the officeholder faces a positive probability of losing 
power, he or she would prefer to defer taxes to the future while, in the meantime 
buying political support through increased expenditures that cause a positive 
trend in the fiscal deficit.
Consider the following scenario. Suppose a government finds that it is 
losing popular support. It does not matter whether the government was popularly 
elected; it may need to increase its popular support to avoid losing power. This 
decline in popular support gives it an incentive to “purchase” support either by 
reducing taxes or increasing spending in ways that it believes will increase its 
political support. It can only do this through increased borrowing. As a result, the 
budget deficit will begin to trend upward as the government’s political position 
weakens. (A rising deficit can occur for other reasons as well.) But whether 
or not the increased spending (or decreased taxes) increases the government’s 
support, the rising debt will eventually increase the government’s default risk. 
If the potential for default means the government will have to cut back on 
expenditures that were buying political support, then the increased probability 
that this spending will eventually come to an end causes the government to lose 
support and eventually lose power. 
This paper explores this idea for a particular developing country, Chile, 
between 1833 and 1999. If the premise of this paper is correct, then points in 
time when structural fiscal reforms occur (structural breaks in the fiscal deficit 
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The debt will drop after the regime which attempts to buy political support loses 
power. The debt will grow once again when a regime sees the political need to 
begin buying political support through expansion of government programs. 
The policy implications of this paper are strong: Financial resources such as 
those provided by the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral funding 
organisms may not be as useful as has been believed unless a profound reform 
in political institutions is first accomplished. Moreover, financial support may 
even be damaging under these circumstances (Caballero and Dornbush 2002).
This paper is organized as follows: The next section presents the model 
which adds the political instability variable to the models of (Barro, 1979) and 
Ghosh (1995) and shows that if political instability exists, then the cointegrating 
vector between taxes and government spending can be written as [1 γ ] with 
0 < γ < 1. Section 3 studies the order of integration of fiscal series for Chile 
between 1833 and 1999. Section 4 examines the stability of the cointegration 
vector [1 - γ ] between total revenue and total spending. If γ < 1, the level of 
political instability is high and, therefore, points in time with the highest likelihood 
of γ being less than one are expected to correspond to periods of political unrest. 
Section 5 analyzes endogenous break-points in the cointegration rank between 
taxes and spending. It provides evidence of two regimes in the time series 
process followed by budget deficits in Chile: a first regime with γ < 1 and a 
second regime with γ = 1 and with taxes and government spending cointegrated. 
Finally, we look to history to tell us if the breakpoint found corresponds to a 
time of political and fiscal reform. Final remarks are presented in Section 6 and 
our conclusions are in Section 7.
2.  Intertemporal Model of Fiscal Deficit
Gosh (1995) uses Barro’s (1979) tax-smoothing model to derive the optimal 
path of taxes and therefore of the fiscal deficit given the path of government spending 
by a benevolent government. During any period t, the government chooses a tax 
path that minimizes the present value of the distortionary cost of taxes:
(1)
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According to (1) the distortionary cost of non-lump sum taxes during any 
period s is proportional to the square of the average tax rate during the period,   
ts defined to be total collection of taxes divided by GDP (See also Bohn (2005) 
and Pasten and Cover (2010a)) In equation (1) E is the expectation operator, 
It is the information set available to the government during period t, and b is 
the government’s subjective discount factor. It is assumed that the government 
minimizes (1) subject to its dynamic budget constraint:
(2)  Dt+1 - Dt = r⋅Dt + (Gt - τt⋅Yt)The Political Economy of Unsustainable Fiscal Deficits 175
where Dt is the stock of government debt at the beginning of period t, Gt is the 
exogenous level of government expenditures (net of interest) in period t, Yt is 
output during period t, and ris the constant real interest rate. The left hand side 
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Dividing each variable in (3) by Yt and assuming output grows at the constant 
rate n allows the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) to be written as:
(4)
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where lower-case letters represent the corresponding variables now expressed as 
a share of output, and R = (1 + n)/(1 + r) < 1 is the effective discount factor. 
Applying a similar normalization to the one period budget constraint (2) yields:
(5)  (1 + n)dt+1 = (1 + r)dt + gt - τt ,
In finance literature it is common to interpret a non-zero value for the 
limit term in (4) as a bubble. Hence, for many authors (e.g., Trehan and Walsh, 
1988, 1991; Cashin et al., 1998; Hakkio and Rush, 1991; Hamilton and Flavin, 
1986; Quintos, 1995) a non-zero value for  lim
s
s t R d
→∞
-  indicates that the process 
generating dt is non-sustainable. Otherwise,






Minimizing (1) subject to (5) and (6) yields the optimal tax rate for each period:
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is the tax-the tilting parameter. The value of γ depends upon whether the government 
places a relatively low weight on the future (β < R which implies γ < 1), the 
same weight as the market (β = R which implies γ = 1), or a relatively high 
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If the government discounts the future at a relatively high rate (and thus 
β is relatively low), then it is said that taxes are tilted toward the future because 
the government must increase taxes over time in order to service its accumulating 
debt. (This follows because dt+1 > dt for any t during which γ < 1.) As a result 
there is an upward trend or drift in the government’s debt. On the other hand, if 
the government discounts the future at the same rate as the market, then β = R 
and γ = 1 and it is said that there is no tax tilting. In this case expected tax 
revenue (as a share of output) does not change over time unless there is a change 
in permanent government spending. When γ = 1 the government is following the 
tax-smoothing model and (to use the terminology of Ghosh (1995) and Cashin 
et al. (1999)) the resulting fiscal deficit is called the tax-smoothing component 
of the fiscal deficit. Equation (7) implies that the tax-smoothing component of 





*is the tax-smoothing component of the deficit and gt
r = (r - n)dt + gt 
represents public spending inclusive of interest. Since the model implies that 
deft
* is stationary, if both τt and gt
r are integrated variables then (9) defines a 
cointegrating relationship and γ -1 can be estimated by regressing gt
r on τt, or 
alternatively, γ can be estimated by a reverse regression of τt on gt
r.
The main empirical interest of this paper is whether the parameter γ , the 
tax-tilting parameter, behaves in a manner consistent with the idea that political 
instability causes financial instability. Since the fiscal deficit grows more rapidly 
if there is tax tilting (γ  < 1), then we would expect to find a value of γ less than 
one only during periods of relatively high political instability. 
Pasten and Cover (2010b) present one way in which the value of γ can 
depend on political stability. They assume that the government discount factor 
equals the probability that the government will stay in power (p ≤ 1) times 
the market discount factor, or β = pR.1 This changes the expression for the 



















A reduction in p, the probability of survival, indicates a higher degree of political 
instability. 
A few other authors have suggested that the degree of tax-tilting is 
dependent on the degree of political instability. For example, Cashin et al. (1999, 
1 The idea that the government discount factor equals the market rate times the probability of the 
government surviving one more period in Pasten and Cover (2010b) is derived from a model based on 
Blanchard’s (1985) model of a consumer with an uncertain life expectancy, which in turn is based on 
the work of Yaari (1965). Huang and Lin (1993), Ghosh (1995) and Olekans (1996), who implicitly 
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p.14) states that “Tax tilting could occur, for example, if the current government 
is unsure of its reelection prospects and therefore favors higher current debt 
levels than are implied by tax-smoothing, in order to exert an influence of the 
future spending activities of rival political parties who assume office … ”. Also, 
Cerda and Vergara (2008, p. 2479) write, “Hence, in an election in which the 
incumbent forecasts a difficult reelection, he/she might increase subsidies to 
increase his/her possibilities”.
The greater the degree of political instability, the lower the probability 
that the government will remain in power, the lower the value of the tax-tilting 
parameter γ, the more rapidly government debt increases, and the greater the 
likelihood that a negative shock to government revenues will cause a fiscal crisis. 
In practice, the impending fiscal crisis either causes the government to fall, or 
the government falls and then a new government deals with the fiscal crisis. 
Hence, during a period leading up to a fiscal crisis we expect τt and gt
r to grow 
(or drift upwards) and γ < 1. 
Econometrically, this implies that during periods of political stability in 
Chile, we expect to find that either (1) τt and gt
r follow stationary stochastic 
processes, or (2) if they are nonstationary, they are cointegrated with a cointegrating 
vector of [1γ = 1] in a regression of τt on gt
r. On the contrary, during a period of 
political instability, they must be integrated of at least order one, I(1), and γ < 1 
in a regression of τt on gt
r. Although the transversality condition (6) continues to 
hold, causing the budget deficit to be sustainable in a mathematical sense, Quintos 
(1995, p. 410) calls this weak sustainability because if γ < 1, “it is inconsistent 
with the government’s ability to market its debt in the long run … and has serious 
policy implications because a government that continues to spend more than it 
earns has a high risk of default and would have to offer higher interest rates to 
service its debt”. A similar point is made by Bohn (2007).
The testing procedure then proceeds as follows. If τt and gt
r are each I(1) 
for the whole period in Republican Chile (1833-1999), and deft (fiscal deficit 
as a share of GDP) is stationary, the conclusion is that the country’s deficit 
has been strongly sustainable because it implies that τt and gt
r are cointegrated 
variables with γ = 1. This is expected since in the long run countries do not 
go bankrupt ex post. Next, we search endogenously for structural breaks in the 
cointegration vector between taxes and spending in order to find periods with 
the highest probability of γ < 1. As long as the order of integration of τt and 
gt
r is at least one, then, according to our model, such periods will be ones of 
relatively high political instability.
Finally, we test the null hypothesis γ = 1 against the alternative γ < 1. 
We expect this null to be rejected only if there is political instability. If the null is 
accepted it suggests that there is political stability (and p = 1 in equation (10)). 
To implement it, we look for evidence of two regimes in the time series process 
followed by τt and gt
r in Chile: a first regime with γ < 1 and a second regime 
with γ = 1 and with τt and gt
r cointegrated. This allows us to define the latter as 
a period of strong sustainability in the fiscal deficit and therefore one of political 
stability. The analysis is applied to Chile during the 1833-1999 period.178 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 47 (Noviembre) 2010
3.  Analyzing the Sustainability of the Fiscal Budget 
in Chile: 1833-1999
This section analyzes the possible stationarity of the fiscal deficit in order 
to test the hypothesis that the deficit has been strongly sustainable over the long 
run between 1833 and 1999. The data for GDP, total expenditures, total revenue 
and the overall fiscal deficit for Chile’s consolidated central government have 
been taken from a series rigorously constructed by Wagner et al. (2000) comprised 
of information for the Chilean fiscal sector from 1833 to 1999. 
Figure 2 displays central government revenue and expenditures (as a 
share of GDP) for the period 1883-1999. As can be seen in the figure, both 
variables tend to meander around a trend. The apparent structural break that 
emerges around the middle of the 1970s is the result of structural reforms 
implemented by the military government of General Augusto Pinochet.
FIGURE 2
CHILE: TOTAL REVENUE AND TOTAL SPENDING
1833-1999
Source: Wagner et al. (2000).
According to the previous section, if the time-series process followed 
by the deficit is stationary, the null hypothesis that the fiscal deficit has been 
(strongly) sustainable cannot be rejected by the data. There can be no financial 
crisis if the deficit follows a stationary process. Column (2) of Table 2 presents 
a set of unit root tests for deft (fiscal deficit as a share of GDP). As can be 
seen from entries in the table, every statistic rejects the null hypothesis of a 
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in every case the corresponding z-statistic fails to reject the absence of a trend 
in the series (not reported). The results presented in Table 2 therefore provide 
support for the proposition that over the long run, fiscal policy in Chile has 
been strongly sustainable. 
TABLE 2 
TESTS FOR UNIT ROOT IN DEFICIT: 1833-1999
∆ ∆ x x x t t t j j
p




ADF –2,914(6) –2,886 –2,576
GLS-DF –2,840(6) –2,021 –1,712
PP(z(r)) –41,972(6)  –13,832 –11,088
PP(z(t))  –4,921(6) –2,886 –2,576
Source: Authors’ computations.
ADF: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test; GLS-DF: GLS Dickey-Fuller Test; PP((z(r)): z(r) Phillips-
Perron Test; PP(z(t)): z(t) Phillips-Perron Test. In brackets the optimal number of lags (p) selected 
according to the Ng-Perron (1995) statistic. 
4.  Stability of the Cointegration Vector: 1833-1999
Figures 3 and 4 display estimates of the parameter γ-1 obtained by 
applying the Johansen normalization method (Johansen, 1988) with robust 
standard errors to a rolling window of 51 observations. The first point in each 
figure is for the subsample 1833-1883, the second for the subsample 1834-1884, 
and so on. Since γ < 1 implies political instability, we would expect that the 
samples with the highest marginal significance level in a one-tailed test of the 
null hypothesis γ-1 = 1 against the alternative γ-1 > 1 will end with those years 
in which there was a relatively high degree of political instability. (Adding a 
year of political instability increases the probability that the null is rejected.) 
These observations are identified by looking at the lower confidence interval in 
Figures 3 and 4. According to Figure 3 which uses a 95% confidence interval, 
the samples for which it is most likely that the null γ-1 = 1 is rejected against 
the alternative γ-1 > 1 end with the years 1885-1886, 1891-1892 and finally 
1969-1976. Aside from the years 1885-1886 which are at the beginning of the 
sample, for the period 1891-1892 the highest point corresponds to the first of 
those years: 1891. For the period 1969-1976 the highest value corresponds 
to the year 1972. 
According to Figure 4 which uses a 99% confidence interval, there are only 
a few samples that reject the null hypothesis against the one-sided alternative. 
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that end in the year 1891 (when the country was experiencing a civil war) and 
each of the samples that end during the period 1969-1974. The sample with the 
highest marginal significance level ends with the year 1972 (one year before 
the coup d’etat that deposed President Allende). 
In summary, statistically the highest probability for γ -1>1 (or γ < 1) 
and therefore the highest probability of deposition (p < 1) corresponds to 
years within the periods of time when in fact two presidents were overthrown. 
Furthermore, these events correspond to the most conflictive political periods 
in post-independence Chile.
5.  Stability of the Cointegration Rank: 1833-1999
In this section the stability of the cointegration rank is studied rather than 
the cointegration vector between government spending and revenue because, as 
previously mentioned, some authors have argued that in order for the deficit to 
be sustainable, revenue and spending inclusive of interest payments (both as a 
share of GDP) must be cointegrated if both are I(1) processes. 
One possible approach is to split the time series into two sub-samples, 





Year corresponds to the last year of a sub-sample with 51 data points. 
Parameter estimated to be γ–1 by a vector error correction (VEC) model with 
two lags in the short-run equation. Order of lags based in Ng-Perron (1995) 





Year corresponds to the last year of a sub-sample with 51 data points. 
Parameter estimated to be γ–1 by a vector error correction (VEC) model with 
two lags in the short-run equation. Order of lags based in Ng-Perron (1995) 
sequential procedure.
reasons. First, the stabilization of fiscal policy after the military coup did not 
necessarily occur immediately; second, there are lags in the series that could 
generate some inertia; third, it is likely that the reforms applied at the beginning 
of the regime were modest; fourth, the military regime was not strongly settled 
immediately after taking power, and last (but not least given the context of this 
paper), assuming a specific cut-off point exposes the findings to the conventional 
criticisms in time series literature regarding the inclusion of exogenous breaks 
(Zivot and Andrews, 1992).
Therefore, in this paper we search for an endogenous structural break 
in the cointegration rank between total revenue and total spending. Figures 5 
and 6 present results of a set of Johansen tests for the number of cointegration 
vectors sequentially estimated. In this procedure each window includes one 
more observation than the previous one, so that they grow in size from smallest 
(years 1833-1863, 31 data points) to largest which includes the entire sample 
(years 1833-1999, 167 data points). 
Figure 5 presents the trace statistics (Johansen, 1988, 1991) for the null 
hypothesis of zero against the alternative of one cointegrating vector. Until 
the sample includes the year 1975 these trace statistics are below the critical 
value. Therefore, from 1833 to 1974 spending and taxes are, unambiguously, 182 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 47 (Noviembre) 2010
not cointegrated variables. Figure 5 also shows that from 1975 onward, the null 
hypothesis of zero co-integrating vectors “is rejected” against the alternative of 
one co-integrating vector. 
In order to evaluate whether the variables are cointegrated starting in 
1975, it is necessary to test the null of one co-integrating vector against the 
alternative of more than one co-integrating vector. Figure 6 displays the trace 
statistic for this test and its corresponding critical value. Since the statistic is 
below its critical value the null of one co-integrating vector cannot be rejected 
against the alternative of more than one co-integrating vector and thus, starting 
in the year 1975, total revenue and total spending are cointegrated with one 
conintegrating vector.
However, as one referee has correctly pointed out, cointegration in the 
time series deficit process does not necessarily imply a probability of deposition 
equal to one. As mentioned above, not only must the two series be cointegrated, 
but it also must be the case that γ =1 in order for the deficit to be strongly 
sustainable. Therefore we use the residual-based tests for cointegration with 
regime change developed by Gregory and Hansen (1996) to analyze jointly the 
hypotheses of cointegration and γ = 1. 
FIGURE 5:
SEQUENTIAL JOHANSEN TEST FOR ZERO COINTEGRATION VECTOR
1833-1999
Source: Authors’ computations.
Sequential trace statistics (Johansen 1988, 1991) for the null of zero cointegration 
vectors against the null of one cointegration vector. Year corresponds to the last 
year of a sub-sample with a fixed initial point in 1833. Parameter estimated by 
a VEC model with four lags in the short-run equation. Order of lags based on 
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Gregory and Hansen (1996) modify the usual cointegration tests by 
allowing for the possibility of a change in the cointegration vector under the 
alternative hypothesis. Consider this equation for τt:
(12)  τt = γ1gt
r + γ2gt
rjt-1 + et ,
where γ1 denotes the tax-tilting parameter before the regime shift and γ2 denotes 
the change in the tilting parameter after the shift; et is an I(0) stochastic error 
























where the unknown parameter Γ denotes the last observation before the 
regime change. The standard procedure proposed by Gregory and Hansen is 
a residual-based test of the null of no-cointegration against the alternative of 
cointegration with regime shift. The relationship given by (12) is estimated 
FIGURE 6
SEQUENTIAL JOHANSEN TEST FOR ONE COINTEGRATION VECTOR
1975-1999
Source: Authors’ computations.
Sequential trace statistics (Johansen 1988, 1991) for the null of one cointegration 
vectors against the null of more than one cointegration vector. Year corresponds 
to the last year of a sub-sample with a fixed initial original point in 1833. 
Parameter estimated by a VEC model with four lags in the short-run equation. 
Order of lags based on Ng-Perron (1995) sequential procedure. 184 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 47 (Noviembre) 2010
by ordinary least square (OLS) and Dickey-Fuller unit roots tests are applied 
to the regression residuals. Gregory and Hansen compute this test-statistic for 
each possible regime shift and choose as the breakpoint the one that yields the 
smallest value of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic, ADF*,2 since the 
smallest value constitutes evidence against the null hypothesis. The break point 
with the smallest value is for Γ = 1975 with ADF* = -5.59. Since the critical 
value is -5.50, the null hypothesis of no break is rejected and the alternative 
of a structural break in 1975 is accepted.3
Figure 7 plots the values of ADF(s) over the truncated sample. As 
mentioned, the smallest test-statistic occurred about 1975, while Table 3 presents 
the estimated coefficients for equation (12) estimated with a known breakpoint 
in 1975. The estimate of the tax-tilting parameter up to 1975 is 0.815 which 
statistically is significantly less than one, while the value after 1975 is 0.999 
which does not differ statistically from one.
FIGURE 7 
REGIME SHIFT WITH ADF
Source: Authors’ computations.
2 Gregory and Hansen (1996) recommend that the sample of possible breakpoints exclude the first 
and last 15% of the overall sample. We reduced this to 10% to allow for breaks nearer the end of the 
sample. The lag truncation selected was K = 0 for a similar reason.
3 Critical value at the 5% level of significance is reported by Gregory and Hansen (1996) for the regime 
shift model with m = 2 regressors (constant and slope).The Political Economy of Unsustainable Fiscal Deficits 185
TABLE 3
ESTIMATION OF TAX/SPEND RELATIONSHIP WITH REGIME SHIFT: CHILE
 1833-1999












OLS regressions with structural shift. Dependent variable is total revenue,τt. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** denote significance at the 1 percent level. 
6.  Final Remarks
Thus, we find that there is a structural break in the relationship between 
the time series processes followed by taxes and government spending in Chile. 
Does this conclusion make sense? The break occurs in 1975, less than two 
years after the violent coup that deposed President Salvador Allende. That 
year, President Pinochet consolidated his power over the country as well as his 
power over the junta, retaining sole chairmanship (this position was originally 
going to be rotated among the four branches of the armed forces) The measures 
implemented by members of Pinochet’s economic team during those years were 
the most dramatic structural reforms ever in Chile’s history. Furthermore, as 
summarized by Collier and Sater:
Yet the Chicago Boys by no means won an instant victory 
[at the beginning of the military regime]. At a moment of steeply 
rising prices and mounting unemployment, their austere vision of 
unrestrained capitalism seemed altogether too risky to many military 
men, not to mention business leaders. During 1974, however, Chile 
began to feel the effects of the devastating international recession 
caused by the “First Oil Shock”—the quadrupling of oil prices 
following the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. In mid 1974 the 
copper price started to fall alarmingly. Moreover, despite the regime’s 
initial efforts, inflation still seemed to be largely out of control. These 
mounting difficulties coincided with the consolidation of Pinochet’s 
personal power. It was at this point (March 1975) that the assertive 
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fit to visit Chile; he talked to Pinochet, emphasizing the need for 
“shock treatment” to eliminate inflation. In April 1975, after hearing 
the arguments and counter-arguments of economists at a weekend 
conference at Cerro Castillo [the Chilean Camp Davis], Pinochet 
threw caution to the winds, came down decisively in favor of the 
Chicago Boys, conferred extraordinary powers on Jorge Cauas (his 
finance minister since July 1974), and appointed Sergio de Castro 
[another Chicago Boy] as Economy Minister” [emphasis added].4 
Thus, history suggests that 1975 is a more appropriate year for the structural 
break than 1973 or 1974.
A few caveats are worth mentioning before concluding. First, the model 
used in this paper does not assume that political instability is the only cause of a 
fiscal policy imbalance. As mentioned in the introduction, a growing deficit can 
be explained by other reasons as well. But the model does imply that political 
instability makes fiscal policy imbalance and government financial crisis more 
likely to occur. 
Second, the empirical work in this paper does not address causality 
directly and a question remains: Does political instability cause fiscal policy 
imbalance, or is it the other way around? Our empirical procedure is to search 
for periods in which the estimated tax-tilting parameter has a value less than 
one and therefore, periods during which government policy creates a fiscal 
policy imbalance. Next, we ask whether these are years in which there clearly 
was political instability in Chile. Because periods leading up to the civil war 
of 1891 and to the military coup of 1973 and the period during which General 
Pinochet was consolidating his power are clearly times of political instability, 
our results support our model, although not as strongly as a formal causality 
test would. But we do not have a long time series for a variable that represents 
the degree of political instability in Chile. Thus, it is impossible to use a more 
formal causality test and also impossible to estimate an appropriate VAR model 
that could be used to calculate how taxes and government spending respond to 
a one-standard-deviation structural shock to political stability. 
Third, we have presented evidence from only one country. Does the way in 
which the tax-tilting parameter appears to depend on political instability in Chile 
hold in other countries as well, particularly those mentioned in the introduction? 
Pasten and Cover (2010b) use a series of political variables taken from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as proxies for political instability , as 
well as data on fiscal policy from the Oxford Latin America Economic History 
Database, to examine the issue for a panel of 19 countries over a relatively short 
sample period. Their results support the proposition that an increase in political 
risk increases the degree of tax-tilting, suggesting that the results found for Chile 
hold for other Latin American countries as well. 
4 Collier and Sater (2004), page 365.The Political Economy of Unsustainable Fiscal Deficits 187
7.  Conclusions
This paper uses an intertemporal model of public finances to show that it is 
possible for political instability to cause unsustainably large government budget 
deficits. The model implies that governments respond to political instability by 
tilting taxes to the future (or increasing the current budget deficit), eventually 
weakening the government’s fiscal condition. This suggests that when taxes 
are tilted to the future, it is more likely that political instability exists. On the 
other hand, if taxes are not tilted toward the future, it is more likely that there is 
political stability. The idea behind the model is that political instability affects 
the incentives faced by the government, causing it to undertake myopic fiscal 
policies in order to increase the probability of its survival in office. This is done 
by delaying taxes (or advancing spending) in order to buy political support, 
thereby imposing a positive trend on the deficit process. 
Empirically, the paper examines tax-tilting along with the possible 
cointegration of taxes and government spending in Chile for the period 1833-
1999. Overall, the process that the Chilean central government budget deficit 
followed for the whole sample was found to be stationary, implying that if 
government spending and taxes (as a share of output) are not stationary, they 
must be cointegrated. Searching endogenously for structural breaks in the 
cointegration vector between taxes and spending, we find that the periods with 
the highest probability of taxes being tilted toward the future coincide with 
periods of intense political unrest. Finally, we present evidence of there being 
at least two regimes in the fiscal-policy time series for Chile; a first regime in 
which taxes were on average tilted toward the future and a second regime with 
no tax-tilting. Formally, this implies that we reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration between taxes and government spending and accept the alternative 
of cointegration with a structural break after 1975, a period of both fiscal and 
political reforms.
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